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LESS IS MORE: A MOVE TOWARD SANITY IN THE BUDGET
PROCESS
DONALD B. TOBIN*
The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974
("Budget Act")' was originally designed as a structural mechanism which
would allow Congress to consider the entire federal budget in the aggregate. It
was an attempt to gain control over the fragmented way in which the Congress
considered the budget, and to counter President Nixon's attempts to increase
2the President's power over the purse. The Budget Act consisted of structural
changes and was policy neutral since it contained no preference or bias for any
specific type of fiscal policy.
During the late 1970s and 1980s, the federal budget deficit began to sky-
rocket.3 High unemployment, high inflation, and supply-side economics all
contributed to the growing deficit. As the budget deficit exploded, politicians
attempted to grapple with the ever increasing deficit problem. However, there
was no consensus regarding what substantive policies should be enacted to
bring the deficit under control. Absent any consensus regarding substantive
policy, Congress turned to budget process changes as a panacea for deficit re-
duction. Thus, the Budget Act was transformed from a policy neutral mecha-
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1. The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344,
88 Stat. 297 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 601-688 (1994 & Supp. I 1995))[hereinafter
CBA].
2. The express purposes of the act were:
(1) to assure effective congressional control over the budgetary process; (2) to provide
for the congressional determination each year of the appropriate level of Federal revenues
and expenditures; (3) to provide a system of impoundment control; (4) to establish na-
tional budget priorities; and (5) to provide for the furnishing of information by the execu-
tive branch in a manner that will assist the Congress in discharging its duties.
CBA § 2, 88 Stat. at 298 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 621 (1994)).
3. The deficit rose from $72.7 billion in 1980 to $340.5 billion in 1992. CONGRESSIONAL
BUDGET OFF., THE ECONOMIC AND BUDGET OUTLOOK: FIscAL YEARS 1997-2006 134 (1996).
The debt held by the public as a percent of Gross Domestic Product rose from 26.1% to 48.8%.
Id. at 135.
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nism which provided a structural method for considering the budget, to a pol-
icy-driven mechanism designed to reduce the deficit.
Congress determined that even if there was no policy consensus for deficit
reduction, the budget process itself could be used to force Congress to reduce
the deficit.5 Congress could then blame the budget process for any unpopular
decisions which were required to reduce the deficit. However, since any proc-
ess can be abused and circumvented, and since budget process legislation is
often a substitute for political will regarding substantive policy, Congress has
often found ways around the process constraints, or the process constraints
themselves have often been insufficient to "force" Congress to reduce the defi-
cit. In addition, because the process was supposed to lead to deficit reduction,
whenever the deficit increased, Congress could blame the process. Congress
seems to believe that if it could just implement the perfect budget process, the
budget would balance itself. However, no budget process can ensure a bal-
anced budget. The solution for reasonable budget policy lies in political will,
not a political process.
6
Rudolph Penner, a former director of the Congressional Budget Office
(CBO), in discussing budget process reform stated, "The problem is not the
process, the problem is the problem."7 Penner's argument was that the solution
to the budget deficit was for Congress to make the politically sensitive deci-
4. For an economic analysis of the deficit problem, see The Federal Budget Process Al-
ready Works: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Gov't. Reform & Oversight, Subcomm. on
Gov't. Management, Information, & Technology, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (March 27, 1996)
(statement by Richard Kogan), available in Westlaw at 1996 WL 158382 [hereinafter Hearings];
see also ROBERT EISNER, THE MISUNDERSTOOD ECONOMY: WHAT COUNTS AND How To
COUNT IT (1994).
5. Hearings, supra note 4.
6. In 1997, after over a year of negotiation, the Congress passed and the President signed
The Balanced Budget Act of 1997, H.R. 2015, 143 CONG. REC. H6342 (daily ed. July 30, 1997)
(passage in the House by a vote of 346-85); 143 CONG. REC. S8410 (daily ed. July 30, 1997)
(passage in the Senate by a vote of 85-15). The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 is designed to
bring the federal budget into balance by 2002. The Act passed by wide margins in both the
House and Senate, and is fibrther indication that bipartisanship and political will, not the budget
process, are the essential elements for a balanced budget. The Congress also passed, The Tax-
payer Relief Bill, H.R. 2014, 143 CONG. REC. D865 (daily ed. July 31, 1997) (passage in the
Senate by a vote of 92-8); 143 CONG. REC. H6664 (daily ed. July 31, 1997) (passage in the
House by a vote of 389-43). The President signed both bills on August 5, 1997. Clinton State-
ment on Taxpayer ReliefAct, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Aug. 5, 1997, available in Westlaw at 1997 WL
5714602; Statement by President Clinton on Signing the Balanced Budget Act, U.S. NEWSWIRE,
Aug. 5, 1997, available in Westlaw at 1997 WL 5714600 (H.R. 2015).
The large margin of victory and the relative ease in passing the measures was due to the bi-
partisan nature of the agreement. The votes in the Senate were sufficient to withstand any fili-
buster or any point of order and indicate that the Senate could have passed both plans without the
necessity of a fast-track procedure.
7. The Problem Is the Problem, WASH. POST, July 18, 1984, at A14.
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sions and balance the budget.8 However, Penner's statement that the process is
not the problem may no longer be accurate. The Budget Act and the budget
process have become so riddled with complicated provisions and loopholes
that the Act itself may now be part of the problem.9 This is not because there
is too little process, as argued by others when Penner made his comments, but
because there is too much process.
The budget process has become riddled with exceptions, exemptions,
waivers and violations. The Budget Act is so complicated that very few mem-
bers of Congress really understand its implications. Not only is the Budget Act
extremely complicated, but the complications make the Act ripe for political
abuse since the Budget Act is interpreted by politically appointed individuals
and the Budget Committee is given wide discretion over enforcement of the
Act.'0 Congress has thus created a massive piece of legislation which is under-
stood by almost no one, and which can be interpreted and manipulated by the
majority to its political advantage. The Budget Act is no longer a mechanism
for considering the federal budget, but instead is a strong tool in the majority's
legislative arsenal."l
Part I of this article examines the history of budget process changes since
the Budget Act was enacted. Part II discusses the current budget rules under
which Congress makes tax and spending decisions. Part III analyzes problems
in the current budget process, and Part IV provides potential solutions for sim-
plifying and reforming the budget process.
12
I. HISTORY OF THE BUDGET PROCESS SINCE THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET
ACT
A. The Congressional Budget Act of 197413
The Budget Act was originally crafted to provide Congress with a structure
8. See also Reagan Rescripts View of Budget System; Analysts See Politics, Not Process,
as Primary Cause of Current Impasse With Hill, WASH. POST, June 16, 1987, at A7.
9. For a general discussion of the budget process and the increased complexity of the tax
code, see Charles E. McLure, Jr., The Budget Process and Tax Simplification/Complication, 45
TAXL. REV. 25 (1989).
10. For example, 2 U.S.C. §§ 601(g), 633(g), 641(d)(4) (1994), all parts of the CBA as
amended, all rely solely on budget estimates from the Senate and House Budget Committees as
the foundation for other budget forecasts and decisions.
11. See infra part ll.A. & II.E.
12. This article mainly discusses the ramifications of the Budget Act in the United States
Senate. The House of Representatives can waive or modify the Budget Act by rule with a major-
ity vote. Therefore, for the House of Representatives, the rules in the Act do not constrain the
House and they provide only guidelines for consideration of the budget.
13. 88 Stat. 297 (codified, in part, as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 601-688 (1995 & Supp. 1)).
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for analyzing the budget and for making fiscal decisions.' 4 Prior to 1974, there
was no mechanism for Congress to consider the entire federal budget. Each
appropriations subcommittee independently appropriated money, each author-
izing committee independently created mandatory programs,' 5 and the tax
writing committe6s independently created revenue bills. Each piece of legisla-
tion still needed to pass the Congress, but each bill was considered individually
and on its own merit. Legislation was not evaluated in the context of the entire
federal budget. The Budget Act was a structural change which provided a
mechanism for Congress to consider individual spending bills in the context of
an omnibus federal budget plan.
16
In addition to the haphazard method for considering spending and revenue
bills, in 1973 the Congress engaged in a bitter battle with the President re-
garding the budget and the President's power to impound funds. 17 The Budget
Act was thus not only a structural change to centralize the budget process, it
was also an assertion of congressional power of the purse.'
8
14. See supra note 2.
15. The General Accounting Office defines mandatory spending:
[Mandatory spending] refers to outlays for entitlement programs such as food stamps,
Medicare, veterans' pensions, payment of interest on the public debt, and nonentitlements
such as payments to states from Forest Service receipts. By defining eligibility and set-
ting the benefit or payment rules, the Congress controls spending for these programs indi-
rectly rather than directly through the appropriations process.
GENERAL ACCT. OFF., A GLOSSARY OF TERMS USED IN THE FEDERAL BUDGET PROCESS 54-55
(revised ed. 1993).
Congress amended the CBA in 1985 to include a definition of entitlement authority, which in-
cludes mandatory spending. The CBA, as amended, defines entitlement authority as spending
authority described by § 401(c)(2)(C) of the CBA. See CBA § 3(9) (as amended by the Balanced
Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 ("Gramm-Rudman-Hollings"), Pub. L. No.
99-177, tit. I, § 201(a)(1), 99 Stat. 1037, 1038 (1985) (amending CBA to add definition of enti-
tlement authority). Section 401(c)(2)(C) describes entitlement authority as:
payments (including loans and grants), the budget authority for which is not provided for
in advance by appropriations Acts, to any person or government if, under the provisions
of the law containing such authority, the United States is obligated to make such pay-
ments to persons or governments who meet the requirements established by such law.
CBA § 401(c)(2)(C), 88 Stat. at 317-18.
16. See, e.g., GENERAL ACCT. OFF., BUDGET PROCESS: HISTORY AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
5 (1995); see generally, S. CONF. REP. No. 924, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 57-58 (1974), reprinted in
1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3591, 3599-600.
17. In 1972 President Nixon asserted his right to independently impound funds, but courts
found that his action violated the Constitution. AFGE v. Phillips, 358 F. Supp. 60, 75 (D.C.
1973). In response to Nixon's action, Congress passed the Federal Impoundment and Information
Act, Pub. L. No. 92-599, 86 Stat 1325 (1972) (codified as amended 31 U.S.C. § 581c-1 (1970 &
Supp. H 1972)), repealed by Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344,
§ 80, 88 Stat. 297, 327 (1974).
18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
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The Budget Act created the Senate and House Budget Committees, 19 and
the CBO.20 The CBO was created to provide the Congress with advice and
expertise regarding all aspects of the budget. The CBO provides macro-
economic analysis, analyzes the costs of various pieces of legislation, monitors
the budget process, provides information regarding revenues and is a general
resource to Congress regarding all matters of budget policy.
2 1
Due to Congress's mistrust of the executive and its reassertion of the power
of the purse, Congress determined that it needed an organization which could
provide information to Congress independent of the executive branch's Office
of Management and Budget (OMB).22 Congress intended the CBO to provide
Congress with the same information and advice that the President received
from OMB.23 Prior to this point, Congress did not have a central authority to
analyze the various components of the federal budget, and it often relied on the
OMB's expertise. 4
The Act also established a macro process for examining the entire federal
budget, set a timetable for consideration of the budget, and required the Con-
gress to consider economic conditions in its consideration of the budget.25 The
Budget Act was designed to be policy neutral. The Budget Act's purpose was
not to reduce the deficit, but to provide for orderly consideration of the nation's
fiscal priorities.26
The procedures in the Budget Act are enforced through "points of order.
'27
These points of order lie for specific violations of the Budget Act.28 If an ac-
tion violates the Act, any Member of Congress may raise a point of order, and
if the point of order is sustained, the offending language may be stricken from
the bill or the bill itself may not be considered. However, the body may waive
19. See CBA §§ 101, 102, 88 Stat. at 299-302.
20. See CBA § 201, 88 Stat. at 302-03.
21. 2 U.S.C. § 602 (1994) (codification of CBA § 202, 88 Stat. at 304-05, as amended).
22. The Office of Management and Budget provides the President with detailed budget in-
formation. It coordinates the preparation of the President's budget submission, and undertakes
extensive analysis and review of various federal programs.
23. H.R. REP. 413, 103rd Cong. 1st Sess. 19 (1993); see also GENERAL ACCT. OFF., supra
note 16, at 5.
24. Philip G. Joyce & Robert D. Reischauer, Deficit Budgeting: The Federal Budget Proc-
ess and Budget Reform, 29 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 429, 431 (1992).
25. CBA § 301, 88 Stat. at 306-08 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 632 (1994)). The
Congressional Budget Act originally called for two budget resolutions. The first provided gen-
eral budget levels and the second to provide binding budget levels. The process was unworkable
and in 1985 Congress provided for a single budget resolution. CONGRESSIONAL REs. SERVICE,
FEDERAL BUDGET, ACCOUNTING, AND FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT LAWS: SUMMARIES AND
SELECTED PROVISIONS 27 (1996).
26. See generally S. CONF. REP. NO. 924, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 57-58 (1974), reprinted in
1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3591, 3599-600.
27. See 2 U.S.C. § 633(c) (1994).
28. Id.
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a budget act point of order.29
B. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 (OBRA)3 °
The 1981 OBRA was the first time Congress attempted to use a recon-
ciliation bill in the manner it is used today. Congress made no specific process
changes, but used the process under the 1974 Act in a way never envisioned. 31
In 1981, President Reagan sought a mechanism for prompt consideration of his
32
economic agenda. Congress and the President latched onto the reconciliation
procedures in the Budget Act. Since reconciliation bills were privileged under
Senate rules, and since there was a limited time period for consideration of a
reconciliation bill, a budget reconciliation bill could not be filibustered, and the
President's package was ensured prompt consideration. 33 Authorizing com-
mittees were instructed to make changes to the revenue code and to mandatory
programs.34 These changes were then reported to the full Senate in one omni-
bus bill.35 Thus, after 1981, the Senate established a procedure for circum-
venting the filibuster and for providing a fast-track method for consideration of
budget legislation.
What was so striking about the process changes in OBRA of 1981 is that
they were one of the most significant budget process changes in the history of
the Budget Act, and they were accomplished without any change in the law.
The reconciliation process has now become the tool for consideration of the
budget, and every major deficit reduction package since 1981 has had a recon-
ciliation bill as its major component.
29. However, some points of order in the Senate may only be waived with sixty votes. See
CBA § 904(c), amended by Budget Enforcement Act of 1990, § 13208(a)(1), 104 Stat. 1388-
619) (providing that §§ 301(i), 302(c), 302(f), 305(b)(2), 305(c)(4), 306, 310(d)(2), 310(f),
31 l(a), 313, 601(b), 606(c), 904(c), & 904(d) may only be waived with sixty votes).
30. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357.
31. The Budget Act originally created reconciliation as a mechanism to reconcile spending
between the first and second budget resolution. The Congress never indicated any intention that
reconciliation be used as a method for enactment of major substantive pieces of legislation.
32. CHARLES TIEFER, CONGRESSIONAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: A REFERENCE,
RESEARCH, AND LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, 885 (1989).
33. Id. at 897-98.
34. Id. at 887.
35. Id. at 885-86.
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C. The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985
("Gramm-Rudman-Hollings 93 6
In 1985, the budget process almost completely broke down and the federal
deficit and debt began to skyrocket. Huge tax cuts, smaller than expected
spending cuts, and a weaker than expected economy all combined to create
historically large budget deficits. 7 These huge budget deficits, combined with
a budget process in near collapse and the need to raise the ceiling on the na-
tional debt to over $2 trillion, led to further budget process changes and the
passage of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985
("GraMm-Rudman-Hollings" or GRH).
38
GRH shifted the focus of the 1974 Budget Act from a structural mecha-
nism for considering budget priorities to a structural mechanism designed to
balance the budget. GRH set year-by-year deficit targets which were designed
to gradually decrease the deficit to zero.39 These deficit targets were enforced
by sequestration, commonly referred to as across-the-board spending cuts. If
the budget deficit in any year exceeded the deficit target, there would be an
across-the-board reduction in spending across all non-exempt direct spending
accounts.40 Half the spending reductions would be achieved from the defense
function and half from non-defense functions. 41 In addition, Congress could
suspend the procedures in times of war or recession.
2
36. Pub L. No. 99-177, 99 Stat 1037-1101 [hereinafter GRH], amended by the Balanced
Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Reaffirmation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-119, tits. I-Il,
101 Stat. 754, and further amended by Budget Enforcement Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101- 508, tit.
XIII, 104 Stat. 573 [hereinafter BEA] (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 900-922 (1988 &
Supp. IV 1992)). For a discussion of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, see Kate Stith, Rewiting the
Fiscal Constitution: The Case of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 593 (1988).
37. The deficit in 1985 was $221.7 billion. The deficit in 1985 was the largest in the Na-
tion's history up to that point. Debt held by the public as a percent of Gross Domestic Product
was at its highest level since the Vietnam War. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFF., THE ECONOMIC
AND BUDGET OUTLOOK: FISCAL YEARS 1997-2006 134 (1996).
38. Joyce & Reischauer, supra note 24, at 433.
39. GRH § 251(a)(1), 99 Stat at 1063 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 901 (Supp. I 1985)), re-
pealed by BEA § 13112(a)(2)(A), 104 Stat at 1388-607.
40. GRH § 251, 99 Stat at 1063 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 901 (Supp. IV 1992)),
amended by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 14002(c),
107 Stat 312 (1993). For a list of exempt programs, see GRH § 255, 99 Stat. at 1082 (codified
as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 905 (1994)).
41. GRH § 251(a)(3)(B), 99 Stat. at 1064.
42. GRH § 254,99 Stat. at 1078-80 (Congress could suspend GRH during recessions); GRH
§ 251(g), 99 Stat. at 1072 (GRH automatically suspended if there is a declaration of war by the
Congress); see also GRH § 258, amended by BEA § 13101, 104 Stat. at 1388-575 (codified as
amended at 2 U.S.C. § 907a (Supp. H 1990)). However, Congress has never suspended the Act
for either event, even during the 1990-1991 recession. In January 1991, the Senate rejected a
joint resolution to suspend the Act by a vote of ninety-seven to two. 137 CONG. RE¢. S1359
(daily ed. Jan. 31, 1991). The Senate rejected the motion a second time in May 1991 by a vote of
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In the original GRIH, the Comptroller General determined whether the
budget deficit in any given year exceeded the deficit target.43 If the budget
deficit exceeded the target, the Comptroller General notified the President that
a sequester was required.44 After such notification, the President issued a se-
questration order which implemented an across-the-board reduction in non-
exempt spending programs. 45 After the issuance of the order, Congress had
two months to act before the sequester would automatically take effect.
46
However, in Bowsher v. Synar,47 the Supreme Court held that the mecha-
nism in GRH for triggering sequestration was unconstitutional in that it vio-
lated the separation of powers doctrine. The Court held that Congress could
not vest executive power in an officer removable by Congress." In 1987,
Congress amended GRH and gave the Director of OMB the power to deter-
mine if the deficit reduction targets were breached.49
D. Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Reaffirmation Act of
19870
In 1987, Congress realized that it would be unable to meet the deficit tar-
gets set out in the GRH.51 The deficit target for 1988 was $108 billion and the
projected deficit was $169 billion.52 Congress and the President were unwill-
ing to make substantive legislative changes to meet the targets.53 In addition, a
sequester of that magnitude would have caused drastic reductions in both de-
fense and non-defense spending. Thus, neither party was interested in passing
legislation to meet the targets, nor did they want to implement an across-the-
92-5. 137 CONG. REC. S5601 (daily ed. May 9, 1991). The Senate rejected the motion a third
time in September 1991 by a vote of eighty-eight to eight. 137 CONG. REC. S13,308 (daily ed.
Sept 18, 1991).
43. GRH § 251(b), 99 Stat at 1068.
44. GRH § 251(b)(2), 99 Stat. at 1069.
45. GRH § 252, 99 Stat. at 1072.
46. GRH § 254(b), 99 Stat. at 1080.
47. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
48. Id. at 721-34.
49. Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Reaffirmation Act of 1987, Pub. L.
100-119, tit. I, § 102(a), 101 Stat. at 754.
50. Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Reaffirmation Act of 1987, Pub. L.
100-119, tit. I, § 106(a), 101 Stat. at 758, repealed by BEA § 13112(a)(2)(A), 104 Stat. at 1388-
607 (1990) (codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 602, 655 (Supp II. 1990)).
51. Deficit targets are extremely problematic since economic assumptions and deficit pro-
jections are never exact. In addition, since the targets in GRH were not adjusted for inflation,
Congress could make significant efforts to reduce the deficit and those efforts could be stymied
by changes in economic conditions.
52. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFF., ECONOMIC AND BUDGET OUTLOOK: FISCAL YEARS
1988-1993, xxii (1987).
53. Tom Kenworthy, Automatic Budget Cuts: A Bitter Pill; Measure Expected To Be Mar-
ginally Effective on Chronic Deficit, WASH. POST, Sept 28, 1987, at A4.
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board sequester. Congress, therefore, amended GRIH and extended the deficit
targets by two years.54 In addition, Congress restored the automatic sequester,
ruled unconstitutional in its previous form by Bowsher v. Synar, by giving the
power to order a sequester to the Director of OMB instead of to the Comptrol-
ler General.
The 1987 changes provided two lessons which should guide future budget
process reform efforts. First, if targets or goals are unrealistic or unreachable,
Congress and the President will find ways to circumvent them. Second, the
1987 changes proved that mere process changes alone would not balance the
budget.
E. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 (OBRA)55
In late 1989, it once again became impossible, or at least impractical, to
reach the GRH targets, even the amended ones. The President and the Con-
gress were in a stalemate over the budget as they sparred over how to reach or
circumvent the GRH targets. President Bush had previously made his "no new
taxes" pledge,56 and Congress was unwilling to make the drastic spending cuts
which would be required to meet the targets if revenue increases were not also
an option. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, and Title XII of
that Act, The Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 (BEA)57 were a compromise
between the President and Congress. President Bush modified his "no new
taxes" pledge and agreed to a deficit reduction package which included some
revenue increases, and Congess agreed to accept further spending cuts and
budget process provisions which would encourage restraint on both appropria-
tions and direct spending.
5 8
The changes implemented due to the budget agreement fundamentally al-
tered the budget process.59 The BEA greatly improved the GRH and the
54. Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Reaffirmation Act of 1987, Pub. L.
100-119, § 106, 101 Stat. at 780.
55. Pub. L. No. 101-508, tit. XIII, 104 Stat. 1388, 1388-573 (codified as amended through-
out 2 U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C. § 1022 (Supp. II 1990)).
56. George Bush, Read my lips: No new taxes Bush: Our Work is Not Done; Our Force is
Not Spent, WASH. POST, Aug. 19, 1988, at A28 (text of George Bush's acceptance speech as
presidential nominee at the 1988 Republican National Convention).
57. BEA, Pub. L. No. 101-508, tit. XIII, 104 Stat. at 1388-573 (codified as amended
throughout 2 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C. § 1022, 31 U.S.C. §§ 11055, 1341, 1342 (Supp. IV 1992)).
58. See 26 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1005 (July 2, 1990) (President Bush's decision to
move away from his "no new taxes" pledge.); for a discussion regarding the events leading up to
the BEA, see AARON WILDAVSKY, THE NEW PoLITIcs OF THE BUDGET PROCESS 482-526
(1992).
59. See Richard Doyle & Jerry McCaffrey, The Budget Enforcement Act of 1990: The Path
to No Fault Budgeting, 11 PUB. BUDGETING & FIN. 25 (1991); James E. Kee & Scott V.
Nystrom, The 1990 Budget Package; Redefining the Debate, 11 PUB. BUDGETING & FIN. 3
(1991).
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Budget Act, but also caused significant confusion regarding the budget proc-
ess. The BEA recognized the flaw of deficit targets in GRH and moved away
from deficit targets toward spending caps.60 It divided the budget into three
parts: 1) overall deficit targets, 61 2) appropriations, 62 and 3) direct-spending
and receipts legislation.
63
The overall deficit targets were similar to those in GRII, except the BEA
deficit targets were adjusted for economic conditions.64 In addition, the deficit
targets were set at realistic levels and did not promise to balance the budget. 65
Thus, if Congress adhered to the spending caps, 66 and the PAYGO require-
ments,67 spending would never exceed the deficit targets and a sequester would
never be necessary.
The second division in BEA placed a cap on discretionary spending.68
Under this system, Congress could not spend more than the cap amount. 69 if
Congress passed an appropriations bills which exceeded the spending caps,
and the excess spending caused the deficit to exceed the target, then a seques-
ter would be required.70 Under the BEA, legislation deemed an "emergency"
by the President and the Congress is exempt from the budget caps and seques-
60. For a more thorough discussion of the components of the BEA, see infra part IL
61. BEA § 13101, 104 Stat. at 1388-583 (amending GRH § 253 and codified at 2 U.S.C. §
903 (Supp. 11 1990)).
62. BEA § 13101, 104 Stat. at 1388-577 (amending GRH § 251 and codified at 2 U.S.C. §
901 (Supp. I 1990)).
63. BEA § 13101, 104 Stat. at 1388-581 (amending GRH § 252 and codified at 2 U.S.C. §
902 (Supp. H 1990)). This section is commonly referred to as Pay-As-You-Go or "PAYGO." As
the name implies, PAYGO requires that any increase in the deficit caused by changes in receipts
or mandatory programs be paid for with corresponding changes to increase revenues or decrease
mandatory spending.
64. BEA § 13101, 104 Stat. at 1388-578 (amending GRH § 251(b)(1) and codified at 2
U.S.C. § 901(b)(1) (Supp. 11 1990)).
65. BEA § 13111, 104 Stat. at 1388-602 (amending CBA § 601(a)(1) and codified at 2
U.S.C. § 665(a)(1) (Supp. H1 990)).
66. BEA § 13111, 104 Stat. at 1388-602 (amending CBA § 601(a)(2) and codified at 2
U.S.C.§665(a)(2) (Supp. 1 1990)).
67. BEA § 13101, 104 Stat. at 1388-581 (amending GRH § 252 and codified at 2 U.S.C. §
665(a)(2) (Supp. 1 1990)).
68. The General Accounting Office defines discretionary spending as spending which is
controllable through the congressional appropriation process. GENERAL ACcT. OFF., A
GLOSSARY OF TERMS USED iN THE FEDERAL BUDGET PRoCESS 42 (1993).
69. The spending caps are enforced by both budget act points of order and by sequestration.
See CBA §§ 601, 602, amended by BEA § 13111, 104 Stat. at 1388-602 (codified as amended at
2 U.S.C. §§ 665, 665a (respectively) (Supp. II 1990)) and GRH §§ 251,253, amended by BEA §
13101, 104 Stat. at 1388-577, 1388-583 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 901, 903
(respectively) (Supp. H1 1990)).
70. BEA § 13101, 104 Stat. at 1388-578 (amending GRH § 251(a)(2) and codified at 2
U.S.C. § 901(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1992)).
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tration.
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In addition, President Bush was extremely concerned that Congress would
meet the spending caps by making drastic cuts in defense spending.72 Thus, in
order to protect defense spending, President Bush insisted upon a "wall" be-
tween defense and domestic spending.73 Therefore, in the first three years of
the BEA, there were separate spending categories for domestic, international
and defense discretionary programs and funds could not be shifted among
these categories without a supermajority vote (three-fifths Senators sworn into
office or sixty votes).74 The BEA thus placed a major impediment on budget
prioritization.
The third major component of the BEA restrained the mandatory or direct
spending component of the budget.75 Mandatory spending and revenue provi-
sions are labelled as such because they are on automatic pilot and are not con-
sidered by Congress on a yearly basis. Spending decisions regarding manda-
tory programs are not made through the annual appropriations process, instead,
funds are automatically disbursed if beneficiaries meet the statutory require-
ments.
76
Unfortunately, direct spending programs can grow dramatically even if
Congress makes no programmatic changes. A recession may cause an increase
in the number of people seeking public assistance, or the costs of caring for
people within a program may increase at higher then expected levels. These
increases are almost completely independent of annual congressional spending
decisions.
Revenues are similarly independent of annual congressional action. Gov-
ernment revenues increase during economic expansions and decrease during
downturns. In addition, the revenue situation is also influenced by tax expen-
71. For an excellent discussion regarding budget emergencies, see William G. Dauster,
Budget Emergencies, 18 1. OF LEGIS. 249 (1992). GRH §§ 251(b)(2)(D), 252(e), amended by
BEA § 13101, 104 Stat. at 574, provide for an exemption from the PAYGO requirements if Con-
gress and the President declare a measure an emergency. See also, supra note 42.
72. Anne Wexler, The Sequester: Get Ready For Pay-As-You-Go Budgets, WASH. POST,
Oct. 30, 1990, at All (editorial).
73. Id.
74. BEA § 13111, 104 Stat. at 1388-602 (amending CBA § 601(b)). The Senate has in-
cluded "walls" between defense and domestic spending in its FY 1996 and 1997 budget resolu-
tion. See S. Con. Res 13, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., § 201 (1995) (fiscal year 1996 budget resolu-
tion); S. Con. Res 57, 104th Cong., 2nd Sess., § 201 (1996) (fiscal year 1997 budget resolution).
For a definition of mandatory or direct spending, see supra note 15.
75. This component is commonly referred to as "PAYGO". See supra note 63.
76. For example, an individual receives unemployment benefits when he becomes unem-
ployed. The payments are automatic once an applicant meets the requirements in the law. Medi-
care works in a similar manner. Medicare expenditures occur automatically if a beneficiary
meets the plan requirements.
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ditures. 77 For example, the government provides taxpayers with a tax deduc-
tion for the mortgage interest on their principal residences. This deduction de-
creases an individual's income tax liability, thus deceasing revenue to the fed-
eral government. However, the amount of the tax deduction varies depending
on the number of homeowners in any given year and on the current interest
rate homeowners must pay. The larger the interest rate the larger the tax dedi-
cation.
Since both direct spending and revenues were independent of the annual
appropriations process, PAYGO was instituted to ensure that direct spending
and revenues did not worsen the projected deficit in any year. Thus, if Con-
gress wanted to increase direct spending, it would either need to cut other di-
rect spending programs or increase revenues. Similarly, if Congress wanted to
cut taxes, it would either need to reduce direct spending or increase revenues
in other areas. Under the Budget Act, it is impermissible to use funds covered
by the PAYGO accounts to supplement programs not included in PAYGO.78
For example, it is impermissible to cut taxes and pay for those tax cuts with
cuts in discretionary spending.79 PAYGO is enforced through its own inde-
pendent sequester and through Budget Act points of order.
80
F. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 ("Clinton Economic Plan)181
The Clinton Economic Plan made no major changes to the BEA. It ex-
tended the budget caps and PAYGO requirements through fiscal year 1998 and
77. CBA § 3(3), 88 Stat. at 299 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 622(3) (1988)) (Tax Expenditure
"means those revenue losses attributable to provisions of the Federal tax laws which allow a spe-
cial exclusion, exemption or deduction from gross income or which provide a special credit, a
preferential rate of tax, or a deferral of tax liability."); see also STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON THE
BUDGET, 102D CONG, 2D SESS., TAX ExPENDITURES: COMPENDIUM OF BACKGROUND MA-
TERIAL ON INDIVIDUAL PROVISIONS (Comm. Print 1992); Edward A. Zelinsky, James Madison
and Public Choice at Gucci Gulch: 4 Procedural Defense of Tax Expenditures and Tax Institu-
tions, 102 YALEL.J. 1165 (1993).
78. As with almost every provision in the Budget Act there are exceptions to this general
rule. First, the budget resolution could specifically provide for reserve funds which allow funds
to be transferred from mandatory to discretionary programs or vice versa. See H. R. CON. RES
178, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. § 305 (1996). Second, the provision could be waived with 60 votes.
Third, through budget scoring conventions, an appropriations bill may get credit, and thus be able
to spend more money, if the mandatory spending reduction is added directly to the appropriations
bill.
79. See 138 CONG. REC. S10,766-67 (daily ed. July 29, 1992) (statements of Sens. Bentsen
and Specter regarding the rule). However, this provision of the Budget Act may be waived with
sixty votes. See CBA § 904(c), amended by GRH § 271, 99 Stat. at 1094.
80. BEA § 13101, 104 Stat. at 1388-581 (amending GRH § 252 and codified at 2 U.S.C. §
665(a)(2) (Supp. H 1990)).
81. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312; see
also H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 213, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1088.
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provided for ten year budgeting.82 Even though the 1993 plan made no major
process changes, it still was important for budget process purposes since it es-
sentially ratified the procedures instituted in 1990.
The budget caps implemented in 1990 significantly constrained discretion-
83ary spending starting in 1993. Therefore, after President Clinton took office,
Congress and the President needed to devise a deficit reduction package which
met the spending caps in the 1990 agreement.84 Congress passed a major defi-
cit reduction package and honored the spending caps from the 1990 agree-
ment.85
G. The Balanced Budget Act of 199586
After the 1994 elections, the Republicans took over the majority in both
the House and Senate. The 1990 process changes were negotiated between a
Democratic Congress and a Republican President and it was unclear if the
1990 agreement could withstand the change in Congress.17 The Budget Act
and GRH were not legislatively amended after the 1994 elections; however,
the budget process was significantly impacted by several non-legislative
changes.
88
First, the. Senate altered its rules regarding asset sales. Prior to 1995, when
the government sold an asset, the proceeds from the sale were not "scored"
89
for purposes of deficit reduction even if selling the asset provided some reve-
nue to the treasury.90 The rationale for the prohibition was that Congress
wanted to discourage short-term solutions to structural budget problems. If as-
set sales were scored, it would encourage short-term thinking since asset sales
82. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 213, supra note 81, at 1091.
83. See William G. Dauster, Budget Process Issues for 1993, 9 J.L. & POL. 9, 13 (1992).
84. Id.
85. H.R CONF. REP. No. 213, supra note 81, at 1092. The 1993 deficit reduction package
has been extremenly successful. Recent estimates indicate that the budget deficit in 1997 will be
under $30 billion, or only 0.5% of GDP. Jackie Chalmes, Budget Deficit of Just $11 Billion So
Far Hints at a Bright Picture for Full Year, WALL STREET J., July 23, 1997, at A2; Beth Belton,
A Booming Economy is Behind the Feat, USA TODAY, July 18, 1997, at Al 1.
86. See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-350 (1995).
87. Several Republican members have proposed significant budget process changes, but they
have yet to become law. See H.R. 4285, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996); H.R. 2599, 104th Cong.,
Ist Sess. (1995).
88. For a discussion of entitlements and the 1995-1996 budget, see Charles Tiefer,
"Budgetized" Health Entitlements and the Fiscal Constitution in Congress's 1995-1996 Budget
Battle, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 411 (1996).
89. The budgetary savings from legislation is estimated by CBO. This action is referred to
as "scoring" legislation. If legislation is not "scored" for purposes of deficit reduction it means
that the legislation provides no budgetary savings for purposes of PAYGO or the budget caps.
90. See e.g. H. Con. Res. 287, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 8 (1992); H. Con. Res. 121, 102d
Cong, 1st Sess. § 7, 105 Stat. 2414 (1991); H.Con. Res. 310, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 5 (1990).
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provide a significant budgetary impact in one year, but often lose money over
the long term.
91
The second major change in 1995 was the modification of the reconcilia-
tion process and the institution of the use of multiple reconciliation bills. In
previous years, Congress provided for one, if any, reconciliation bill in the
budget resolution and all mandatory spending and revenue changes were in-
cluded in that one bill.92 In 1995, the budget resolution allowed for the crea-
tion of three reconciliation bills. One reconciliation bill for welfare changes,
another for Medicare changes and a third to provide a tax cut. 9' A multiple bill
reconciliation process allows for the expedited consideration of several contro-
versial policy measures, and it foreshadows the use of the budget reconciliation
process as a fast-track method of considering controversial legislative meas-
ures.
94
II. THE CURRENT BUDGET PROCESS
The current budget process is divided into three major components: 1) the
budget resolution, 2) reconciliation, and 3) appropriations bills. The budget
resolution sets the basic framework for current and future spending and reve-
nue decisions. The reconciliation bill provides instructions to authorizing
committees to achieve deficit reduction within their jurisdiction. The appro-
priations process allows Congress to fund programs on an annual basis.
A. The Budget Resolution
The budget resolution is the first step in the congressional budget process.
A budget resolution is passed by Congress and does not require the President's
signature. 95 Therefore, it does not have the force of law, but only acts to guide
Congress's actions. The budget resolution contains the aggregate spending
levels for discretionary spending, entitlement spending9 6 and revenues. The
91. 141 CONG. REC. S7221 (daily ed. May 23, 1995) (statement by Sen. Bumpers).
92. See TIEFER, supra note 32, at 885.
93. H.CoN. REs. 178, 104th Cong., 2d Sess § 203(a) (welfare), § 203(b) (Medicare), §
203(c) (tax cut) (1996). Only one reconciliation bill, the welfare provisions, was considered by
the Senate. H.R. 3734, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996). H.R. 3734 was signed by the President on
August 22, 1996. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
193, 110 Stat. 2105.
94. Bill Dauster, The Day the Senate Died: Budget Measure Weakens Minority, ROLL
CALL, May 30, 1996, at 5.
95. See 2 U.S.C. § 632(a) (1994) (giving Congress a deadline for completing a budget reso-
lution by April 15th for the fiscal year beginning in October of the same year).
96. The Congressional Budget Act refers to § 401(c)(2)(C) for the definition of "entitlement
authority." Section 401(c)(2)(C) states:
(C) to make payments (including loans and grants), the budget authority for which is not
provided for in advance by appropriations Acts, to any person or government if, under the
provisions of the law containing such authority, the United States is obligated to make
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resolution also contains suggested levels of spending for each budget category;
however, these levels are solely advisory.
97
The budget process is further complicated by the fact that the suggested
levels of spending by category are established in the resolution by functional
categories. These are the categories used by the Executive Branch and OMB
to categorize spending programs within a topical area. However, when Con-
gress actually spends money, it does so through the appropriations process.
Budget function categories do not directly coincide with the 13 appropriations
subcommittees' jurisdictions. For example, when Congress votes upon a
budget resolution which designates a certain amount of funds for function 300,
Natural Resources and Environment, that funding may be divided between
several appropriations bills. Thus, when the budget resolution increases fund-
ing for the Natural Resources and Environment function, all of the increases
may go to energy programs when Congress actually intended them to go to en-
vironmental programs.98 Since the budget resolution functional totals do not
correspond with the appropriations subcommittees, it is very difficult for Con-
gress clearly to prioritize spending among appropriations bills.
B. The Appropriations Process
Once Congress passes a budget resolution, the Senate and House Appro-
priations Committees divide up the total discretionary spending figure in the
budget resolution among the various Subcommittees on Appropriations. 99 The
Appropriations Committees may divide the aggregate total in any manner they
choose, 100 and the functional totals in the budget resolution are only advisory
as to them.
Once the Appropriations Committees set the subcommittee allocations, the
allocations are binding on each subcommittee. 01 Thus, each subcommittee
such payments to persons or governments who meet the requirements established by such
law.
88 Stat. at 318 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 651 (1994)).
97. 137 CONG. REC. S6324-26 (daily ed. May 22, 1991) (statement by Sen. Sasser, Chair-
man of the Senate Budget Committee).
98. The Appropriations Committee attempts to translate the functional totals into appropri-
ated accounts, but such a translation is almost impossible because the assumptions behind the
functional totals are not disclosed as part of the budget process.
99. See CBA § 602(a), amended by BEA § 13111, 104 Stat. at 1388-603) (aggregate
amount of discretionary spending); CBA § 602(b)(1), amended by BEA § 13111, 104 Stat. at
1388-604) ("Suballocation By Appropriations Committees--As soon as practicable after a
budget resolution is agreed to, The Committee on Appropriations of each House... shall subal-
locate each amount allocated to it... among its subcommittees.")
100. However, when the Budget Act contained separate caps for domestic and defense
spending, the Appropriations Committee could not allocate funds above the spending caps in
each area.
101. 2U.S.C. § 633(b) (1994).
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cannot exceed its allocation without being subject to a budget act point of or-
der.1 02 After the subcommittee allocations are set, each appropriations sub-
committee considers how to distribute the allocated funds among the various
programs within its jurisdiction. These bills are then considered by the Appro-
priations Committee and then by the full House. Therefore, Congress's deci-
sions regarding discretionary spending are implemented through its passage of
thirteen appropriations bills which are considered in the course of the regular
legislative process.
C. The Reconciliation Process
The third major component of the current budget process, reconciliation,10 3
has fundamentally changed both the budget process and the legislative process
as a whole. °4 The reconciliation bill was originally a method to reconcile de-
ficiencies between the first and second budget resolution in a given year.1
0 5
However, the second budget resolution was eliminated and reconciliation re-
mains.
°6
Since the reconciliation bill was intended to force legislative changes in
order to meet the second budget resolution, a reconciliation bill is enacted into
law. 07 However, a reconciliation bill is a privileged bill. It is one of a few
measures which is considered by the Senate with limited debate and is signed
by the President into law. Thus, reconciliation bills can be used as a fast-track
method for considering substantive legislative changes without any fear of a
filibuster in the Senate.
The reconciliation process works in two phases. First, the budget resolu-
tion may include an order to various authorizing committees, including the
Senate Finance Committee and the House Committee on Ways and Means, to
produce changes in budget authority, entitlement authority, or revenues within108
the jurisdiction of the relevant committee. The Budget Committees may not
102. 2 U.S.C. § 633(c)(1994).
103. CBA § 310 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 641 (1994)) (setting forth the reconcilia-
tion process). See also §§ 301(b)(2), (3) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 632(b)(2), (3)
(1994)) (empowers budget resolution to include reconciliation instructions).
104. The fundamental legislative process change instituted as part of the reconciliation proc-
ess mainly impacts the Senate. Reconciliation fundamentally changed the way the Senate consid-
ers legislation since the reconciliation bill cannot be filibustered. Such a change was insignifi-
cant in the House since House rules often provide for limited debate.
105. TIEFER, supra note 32, at 884 n.95.
106. See supra note 25.
107. Budget resolutions are not enacted into law and do not have the force of law. They are
only considered by the Congress, and only bind the Congress.
108. By Senate precedent, reconciliation instructions and a reconciliation bill may either in-
crease or decrease the deficit. The Budget Act gives the Budget Committees the authority to or-
der "changes." 2 U.S.C. § 641(b)(2) (1994). The Act does not specify that these "changes" must
reduce the deficit. In 1995, the budget resolution in the Senate created a reconciliation bill, the
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order the authorizing committees to make specific authorizing changes, but
they may order the authorizing committees to provide a certain level of sav-
ings.109 The reconciliation instructions provide a mechanism for forcing
authorizing committees to make changes in mandatory programs, and the rec-
onciliation process is the central method used by Congress for reducing enti-
tlement spending.
Once the committees make the various changes consistent with the Budget
Committee's instructions, the various changes are compiled by the Budget
Committee in each house into one major budget reconciliation bill.110 The
reconciliation bill is then considered in a privileged manner in each house un-
der strict time constraints."n A total of twenty hours is allocated to consider
reconciliation bills. Such a time constraint is appropriate if the reconciliation
bill was only intended to reconcile budget accounts between a first and second
budget resolution, as originally intended. However, in the current process,
such a time constraint limits the full Senate to only twenty hours of debate on
subjects which significantly change major pieces of legislation.! 12
In addition to limited debate, reconciliation bills are also privileged re-
garding amendments. In the Senate, a Senator may normally offer an amend-
ment on any subject to almost any piece of legislation. However amendments
to budget reconciliation bills must be germane.' 1 3 Moreover, in general, all
sole impact of which, was to increase the deficit. See infra part III.A.
109. 2U.S.C. § 641(c) (1994).
110. Under the new precedent in 1995, the budget resolution may require more than one rec-
onciliation bill. Thus, the Budget Committee may be required to compile the language reported
by various committees into different reconciliation bills. See infra part I.A.
111. CBA § 310(e)(2), 88 Stat. at 316 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 641(e)(2) (1994)) provides
twenty hours for the consideration of a reconciliation bill. These time constraints are most sig-
nificant in the Senate where unlimited debate and a filibuster would have been possible absent
section 310. If entitlement changes were considered outside of the reconciliation process, any
Senator would be entitled to filibuster the bill and proponents would need sixty votes to invoke
cloture and override the filibuster. Thus, avoidance of the filibuster and the supermajority re-
quirement is one of the major reasons that the reconciliation process has become the major legis-
lative vehicle for controversial pieces of legislation which lack broad bipartisan support. See
also supra part II.B.
112. The OBRA of 1995 made massive changes to federal welfare programs. Such changes
would normally be entitled to weeks of debate and consideration. However, since these changes
were considered in the context of a reconciliation bill, they were entitled to only twenty hours of
debate. See infra part III.B.
113. CBA § 305(b)(2), 88 Stat at 311 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 636(b)(2) (1994)) ('No
amendment that is not germane shall be received."). In general, an amendment is germane if it: 1)
strikes a provision in the bill or resolution; 2) changes a number or a date; 3) states purely preca-
tory language; 4) otherwise does not add or expand existing subject matter. See generally
WILLIAM G. DAUSTER, BUDGET PROCESS LAW ANNOTATED 125-37 (also cited as STAFF OF
SENATE COMM. ON THE BUDGET, 103D CONG., 1ST SESs., BUDGET PROCESS LAW ANNOTATED
(Comm. Print 1993)). For a discussion about the possible manipulation of germaneness, see infra
part M.E.2.
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amendments to budget resolutions must be deficit neutral.1 4 There is an ex-
ception, however, in that a motion to strike a provision is always in order.
115
Since a motion to strike usually eliminates a provision included in the recon-
ciliation bill which reduces the deficit, a successful motion to strike will often
have the effect of increasing the deficit. Under this rule it would not be ger-
mane to make changes which would decrease the magnitude of a spending cut,
but it would be germane to completely eliminate the cut. For example, under
the current procedure, it would not be in order to reduce a Medicare cut in-
cluded in the reconciliation bill, but it would be in order to strike the entire
Medicare reduction.
1. The Byrd Rule116
Some Senators recognized the potential for abuse of the reconciliation
process and were concerned that individuals would attempt to use the recon-
ciliation process as a way to circumvent the filibuster requirement in the Sen-
ate. The general view in the Senate was that deficit reduction was so important
that it warranted fast-track consideration. However, Senators wanted to make
sure that this privileged procedure was applied only to measures which would
decrease the deficit.
117
In order to stop the abuse of the reconciliation process, the Senate passed
the "Byrd Rule,"118 which was designed to stop the Senate from considering
extraneous matters on the reconciliation bill.119 However, the Byrd Rule is in-
credibly complicated and it has become more so as members attempt to push
114. CBA § 310(d)(2) (codified at2U.S.C. § 641 (1994)).
115. Id.
116. CBA § 313, amended by Consolidated Omnibus Budget Act of 1985 § 20001, 100 Stat.
at 390, and further amended by BEA § 13214, 104 Stat. at 1388-621 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 644
(1994)). This section is referred to as the "Byrd Rule" after its sponsor, Senator Robert C. Byrd
of West Virginia.
117. Senator Byrd, the principal sponsor of section 313 stated: 'extraneous,' in [this] context,
is determined by whether or not the language contributes to reducing the deficit and balancing the
budget; otherwise it is extraneous ...." 131 CONG. REC. 528,971 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1985).
118. Since the Byrd Rule was intended to stop the abuse of circumvention of the filibuster,
the Byrd Rule does not facially apply in the House. However, the Byrd Rule does apply to a rec-
onciliation bill which comes to the Senate from the House. Since no Senate reconciliation bill
may include extraneous matter, the Senate restriction, in fact, results in placing the same restric-
tion on the House. See 135 Cong. Rec. S12,589 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1989) (statement of Budget
Committee Chairman Sasser).
119. The codification of the Byrd Rule sets out the definition of extraneous. In general, a
measure will be extraneous if 1) the provisions has no direct budgetary effect; 2) the provision
increases the deficit and the net effect of provisions reported by the Committee reporting the title
containing the provision fails to meet its reconciliation instruction; 3) the provision is not in the
jurisdiction of the Committee which reported the provision; 4) the provision produces budgetary
changes which are merely incidental to the non-budgetary components of the provision. 2 U.S.C.
§ 644(b)(1)(A) (1994).
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the envelope regarding the rule. The Byrd Rule is now one of the most com-
plicated and manipulated parts of the budget process.120
The rule requires that an extraneous matter may not be included in a rec-
onciliation bill without the consent of at least sixty senators.2  The Byrd Rule,
therefore, ensures that an extraneous provision will only be included in a rec-
onciliation bill if it has the same support that would be required if that matter
was considered outside the budget context. The confusion and manipulation
regarding the Byrd Rule usually revolves around section 313(b)(1)(D) which
states that a provision will be considered extraneous if the effect on the deficit
is merely incidental to the non-budgetary components of the provision.122 This
test is tremendously ambiguous and requires a subjective determination by the
Chair. However, in practice, the Chair usually follows the advice of the
Parliamentarian.124 The Parliamentarian has not provided a bright-line test and
considers each provision on a case-by-case basis. 2  Moreover, although the
Parliamentarian will discuss and debate matters with all staff and members
who seek his advice, the Parliamentarian is not required to seek out opposing
points of view. Thus, the Parliamentarian may consider the validity of a provi-
120. See generally ROBERT KEITH & EDWARD DAVIS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE,
103RD CONG., 2D SESS., THE SENATE'S "BYRD RULE" AGAINST EXTRANEOUS MATTER IN
RECONCILIATION MEASURES (1993).
121. CBA § 313 may be waived with sixty votes. See CBA § 904(c), amended by BEA
§13208, 104 Stat. 1388-619.
122. 2 U.S.C. § 644(b)(2)(D) (1994).
123. CBA § 313(a), 88 Stat. at 297 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 644 (Supp. IV 1992) (it is the duty
of the Chair to rule on the point of order). The Constitution provides that the Vice President is
the presiding officer of the Senate. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 3, cl. 4. However, the Vice President
rarely presides in the Senate and usually only does so when his vote is needed to break a tie or on
ceremonial occasions. TIEFER, supra note 32, at 491. The Constitution also provides that the
Senate may choose a President pro tempore to act when the Vice President is absent. U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 5. Senate Rules allow the President pro tempore to appoint an Acting
President pro tempore to preside over the Senate in the Vice Presidents and the President pro
tempores absence. TIEFER, supra note 32, at 493. Traditionally, the President pro tempore has
been the senior most member of the majority party, and since the 1970s the President pro tempore
has appointed only members of his party to the post of Acting President pro tempore. Id. Thus,
except when the Vice President is in the Chair, the presiding officer in the Senate will be a mem-
ber of the majority party.
124. TIEFER, supra note 32, at 509. Historically, the Parliamentarian is nonpartisan in his
rulings. The first Parliamentarian was appointed in 1935 and served until 1965. The second
served from 1965 to 1975. However, in recent times, the Parliamentarian has changed when the
majority party in the Senate changes. Thus, when a new party takes control of the Senate, there
is usually a new Parliamentarian. When the Republicans took control of the Senate in 1981, the
Parliamentarian left and the Assistant Parliamentarian, Bob Dove, assumed the post. When the
Democrats regained the Senate in 1987, Dove left the office and Alan Frumin assumed the post.
When the Republicans regained the Senate in 1994, Dove once again assumed the office of Par-
liamentarian. Id.
125. See DAUSTER, supra note 113, n.580.
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sion without hearing the opposing point of view. Furthermore, since the Par-
liamentarian does not in fact rule on a point of order and only provides advice
to the Chair, and since he does not provide that advice prior to the issue being
raised on the Senate floor, the Parliamentarian reserves the right to change his
mind until he provides advice to the Chair at the moment an issue is considered
on the Senate floor. Thus a member may believe that a specific provision is
valid under the Budget Act, but find out later that the Parliamentarian changed
his mind and advised the Chair that the provision violated the Act.
A member seeking to determine if a proposed provision violated the Byrd
Rule is therefore constrained by decisions which 1) allow the Parliamentarian
to give advice to a party regarding a specific provision in secret, 2) does not
require the Parliamentarian to follow the advice of past Parliamentarians,
126
and 3) allows the Parliamentarian to change his mind.
The purpose of section 313 was to prohibit policy changes masked as defi-
cit reduction measures from being included in reconciliation. 127 Almost all
legislative changes impact the deficit; however, if the budget impact is only
incidental to the policy change, then a small impact on the deficit should not be
considered sufficient to justify the provision. For example, a federal ban on
providing public education to children of illegal immigrants by a state may
have a small impact on the deficit, but its major purpose is to create a policy
change.
2. Protection of Social Security
In addition to deficit reduction, another major substantive policy included
in the Budget Act is the protection of the Social Security Trust Fund.'28 Sec-
tion 301(i) of the Budget Act prohibits the consideration of any budget resolu-
126. In practice, the Parliamentarian rarely changes his mind and usually follows precedent in
his advice to the Chair. Moreover, parliamentary inquiries, a method of asking advice on the
Senate floor regarding procedural matters, provide a Member with the opportunity to put the Par-
liamentarian on record. These inquiries do not form precedents for the Senate. TIEFER, supra
note 32, at 512. However, while rulings of the Chair do form precedents upon which the Senate
should rely, Id., rulings of the Chair are not explained and often provide little guidance for future
decisions. In addition, since only rulings of the Chair are precedential, the Parliamentarian is not
obligated to follow the advice of past Parliamentarians. Moreover, a Parliamentarian may decide
that past decisions of the Chair are in fact wrong and advise the Chair accordingly. The recourse
in the Senate if the Chair rules contrary to precedent and a Senator disagrees with the new inter-
pretation would be to appeal the ruling of the Chair. The full Senate would then vote on the va-
lidity of the Chair's ruling. Senate Rule XX(1) (reprinted in SENATE MANUAL, S. Doe. No. 103-
1, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1993)).
127. See DAUSTER, supra note 113, n.580 (Provisions in OBRA 1993 regarding the earned
income tax credit, empowerment zones and food stamps, each of which increase the deficit, did
not violate § 313(c)(2)(D)).
128. The Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Fund was established under title II of the
Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-433 (1994 & Supp. 1 1995).
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tion or amendment that would decrease the excess of social security revenues
over outlays. 129 However, Congress removed the Social Security Trust Fund
from the budget and when it did so the budget process no longer protected so-
cial security. Therefore, Congress amended the Budget Act to create provi-
sions, often referred to as "fire walls," to protect social security.130 In the Sen-
ate, waiver of the social security "fire walls" requires the vote of sixty
Senators.
131
IH. CURRENT PROBLEMS CONCERNING THE BUDGET PROCESS
The Budget Act has been transformed from a mechanism to consider the
aggregate federal budget to a mechanism for promoting certain policy goals.
As the budget process becomes more a mechanism for promoting policy and
less a mechanism for orderly process, it risks becoming a partisan tool instead
of a bipartisan one. In addition, as policy is written into the process, the proc-
ess may become a substitute for policy. The more the process becomes the
policy, the more likely the process will be relied upon for deficit reduction in
lieu of political will. If there is no will for deficit reduction, then it is inherent
in the creation of budget process that creative politicians will circumvent the
process, or at least maximize the process to their advantage.
Since the budget process has become a method for achieving substantive
policy changes, the Budget Act must change as priorities change. With each
passing change, the Budget Act becomes more cumbersome and complicated.
Process has become the problem--we simply have too much.
A. Reconciliation
The fast-track component of reconciliation bills has made them a very at-
tractive vehicle for legislative initiatives. 132 The Byrd Rule and germaneness
requirements were instituted to ensure that the fast-track mechanism was used
on only rare occasions and primarily for deficit reduction. However, the rec-
onciliation process has now been expanded under a new legislative precedent
and as a consequence, Congress will need to deal with an ever increasing
number of reconciliation bills.
Under the new precedent set by the Parliamentarian, a budget resolution
129. CBA § 301(i), amended by BEA § 13303(b), 104 Stat at 1388-625 (codified at 2 U.S.C.
§ 632(1) (1994)) applies to budget resolutions as reported or amended. Therefore, practically
spealing, section 301(i) applies to amendments to budget resolutions. See H. Con. Res. 287,
102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1993).
130. Congress responded to the removal of the Social Security Trust Fund by passing BEA §§
13302, 13303, 104 Stat. at 1388-625.
131. See CBA § 904(c), amended by BEA § 13208, 104 Stat. 1388-619.
132. See supra part I.B.
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may create multiple reconciliation bills.133 In addition, the budget resolution
may create a budget reconciliation bill which solely increases the deficit.
134
The possible consequence of this action is that partisan substantive matters
which normally would have been considered in the legislative process will now
be considered in the reconciliation process.
135
This is not the first time reconciliation was considered as a mechanism for
subverting the normal legislative process. In 1993, the Clinton Administration
encouraged Congress to use the budget reconciliation process as a means of
considering the President's health care reform package.136 Senator Byrd op-
posed doing so since he believed it would be an abuse of the reconciliation
process. 137 However, although reconciliation was clearly not intended as a
means to consider major pieces of substantive legislation such as the Presi-
dent's health care package, consideration of the package in reconciliation may
have been possible in light of the new interpretations surrounding reconcilia-
tion since the President's health care reform measure surely would have im-
pacted the deficit. In addition, since the Byrd Rule and the germaneness re-
quirement have been weakened in recent years, the health care package may
have been able to clear hurdles as well.'38 In fact, if the President's health care
package was considered in the reconciliation package it might be law today.
The fact that the minority had the opportunity to filibuster the measure slowed
down its momentum and helped defeat the health care bill.
In addition, since the establishment of reconciliation bills is done by the
majority in the budget resolution, 3 9 only the majority party will be able to use
the process to circumvent a filibuster. The Senate will then be in the uncom-
fortable situation of having two sets of rules, one for the majority and one for
the minority. The majority could pass a major piece of legislation with a ma-
jority vote while the minority would still be required to overcome a filibuster
by any Senator.
The second consequence of multiple reconciliation bills is that it will be
even more difficult for Congress to make aggregate decisions regarding budget
133. 142 CONG. REc. S5418 (daily ed. May 21, 1996) (Sen. Daschle questioning the Chair
regarding multiple reconciliation bills).
134. Id. at S5417.
135. Id. at S5415 (Sen. Daschle criticizing the process); Id. at S5415 (Sen. Domenici de-
fending the practice).
136. 139 CONG. REC. 54237 (daily ed. April 1, 1993) (statement by Sen. Byrd).
137. Id.
138. Id. Senator Domenici argues that multiple reconciliation bills will not lead to further
abuse regarding the filibuster and that the Byrd Rule and the germaneness requirement will still
prevent the abuse of the reconciliation process. However, the more partisan politics become a
part of the budget process the greater chance that the Byrd Rule and the germaneness requirement
will fail to protect the Minority.
139. See supra part II.C.
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priorities. When the majority increases the number of reconciliation bills, it
also decreases their scope. Since reconciliation requires amendments to be
germane and not extraneous, the more limited the scope of the bill, the less
amendments which will be considered germane. For example, if a reconcilia-
tion bill contained a tax cut and paid for that tax cut with reductions in Medi-
care and Medicaid, an amendment would be in order to reduce the tax cut and
provide increased funding for Medicare and Medicaid. In addition, the
amendment would be in order if it were to cut taxes even further and pay for
the additional tax cuts with additional cuts in Medicare and Medicaid.
However, if the reconciliation bill contained only a Medicare reduction,
then it would not be in order to offer an amendment to offset the Medicare cuts
with revenue increases. Such an amendment would not be in order because the
original reconciliation bill contained no language regarding revenues. Thus,
any amendment regarding revenues would not be germane to the reconciliation
bill. The same would be true if the reconciliation bill only involved a tax cut.
If a reconciliation bill involved only a tax cut, it would not be in order to re-
duce the tax cut and use those savings to increase funding for Medicare and
Medicaid. Once again, the reasoning is that the reconciliation bill only in-
cluded instructions regarding taxes, it contained no instructions regarding
Medicare or Medicaid. Thus, language to reduce the tax cut and provide in-
creased funding for Medicare and Medicaid would not be germane. So if the
majority wanted to avoid a debate regarding whether there should be a tax cut,
or Medicaid and Medicare cuts, it could avoid any amendment to transfer from
one area to the other simply by creating two reconciliation bills.
The result is a budget process which is completely backwards. The Budget
Act was originally created so that the budget could be considered in the aggre-
gate, and Congress could prioritize spending among various budget ac-
counts. 14° However, the proliferation of reconciliation bills will ensure the op-
posite result.
B. Time
Although most Members of Congress probably want to expedite the
budget process even further, in actuality, the reconciliation process is danger-
ously short. A budget reconciliation bill has a maximum time limit of twenty
hours. 141 Such a limited debate made sense when Congress was simply trying
to reconcile funding from the first budget resolution to the second. However,
now that the reconciliation process has become a major process for substantive
legislative change, the twenty hour limit is far too short.
The twenty hours is divided between the majority and minority leaders.
140. CBA § 2, 88 Stat. at 298.
141. CBA § 310(e)(2), amended by GRH § 201, 99 Stat. at 1055 (codified at 2 U.S.C. §
641(e)(2) (1994)).
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Thus each side has only ten hours. A number of those hours are spent talking
generally about the reconciliation bill. As a result, each side has approxi-
mately five hours to consider what might amount to almost one hundred
amendments to the reconciliation bill. Thus, the minority, which took almost
no part in the reconciliation process, has almost no opportunity to debate the
measure and offer amendments. 142 Once time is expired on the resolution,
Senators may continue to offer amendments; however, those amendments are
considered without debate. 143 As a result, Senators vote on amendments with
almost no regard for what is contained within them. Reconciliation bills often
include major changes to the tax code, Medicare and Medicaid programs, envi-
ronmental programs, banking law, and housing programs. Each change would
normally warrant several days of consideration in the Senate. However, under
the reconciliation process each change is barely considered.
C. Lack ofPrioritization
The budget process has become so full of points of order, sequesters and
"walls" that it has become almost impossible to prioritize and reprioritize
spending. With regard to discretionary spending, the "walls" prohibit Con-
gress from transferring spending from domestic to defense and vice versan ab-
sent the vote of sixty Senators.144 In addition, it is a violation of the Budget
Act to transfer spending from discretionary to mandatory spending or vice
versa without the vote of sixty Senators.145 Therefore, a majority in the Senate
could not reprioritize spending from defense to Medicare or from Medicaid to
public safety. The PAYGO process was designed to ensure that mandatory
changes did not increase the deficit; 146 however, if any changes to mandatory
programs are offset by equivalent changes on the discretionary side, the deficit
would not increase. Congress should be able to prioritize spending without a
supermajority vote.
The Budget Act also prohibits using revenue increases or decreases to in-
crease or decrease discretionary spending without the vote of sixty Senators.
147
142. See 141 CONG. REc. S16,034 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1995) (statement by Sen. Byrd)
(comparing how the Senate debated the Civil Rights Act for over 103 days while the Senate is
limited to only twenty hours on a reconciliation bill which makes major changes to welfare pro-
grams.).
143. In practice, thirty seconds is usually given to each side to summarize its position. The
amendment is then immediately considered for a vote. Senators then have approximately ten
minutes to read the amendment and decided how to vote. The result is a multitude of amend-
ments are considered without careful consideration.
144. See supra note 74.
145. See supra note 29.
146. See supra note 63.
147. For a discussion regarding PAYGO, see supra part I.E.
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Therefore, absent a Budget Act waiver,148 Congress could not raise taxes and
use the increase in revenues to pay for added funding for public safety or edu-
cation. In addition, Congress could not cut discretionary speAding and use
those savings to cut taxes. There should be no bias in the process in favor of a
specific program or a specific type of spending. The Act was designed to help
Congress make choices, and it is no longer fulfilling that function. Moreover,
as discussed in the previous section, prioritization can also be negatively im-
pacted through the reconciliation process. If multiple reconciliation bills be-
come the norm of the reconciliation process, then it will be even more difficult
for Congress to prioritize spending.
D. Partisanship
Consideration of the budget, partially due to its subject matter and partially
due to the budget process, has become one of the most partisan activities in the
Congress. Budget packages often include major substantive policy changes. 149
Since these changes can be made without fear of the filibuster,150 thus with
only a simple majority vote, the majority party can ensure passage of a budget
reconciliation bill or a budget resolution by simply maintaining the votes of its
own party. Therefore, the party seeking to pass the reconciliation bill does not
need bipartisan support for the measure.
However, in the Senate, due to the possibility of the filibuster, Republicans
and Democrats often work together to ensure that legislation has bipartisan
support, and thus sufficient support to invoke cloture and break a filibuster.
However, since there is no filibuster threat on either a budget resolution or on a
reconciliation bill, the Budget Committee majority does not attempt to work
with the minority prior to passage of the bill. The majority works with its own
members to ensure that there is sufficient support for the bill on its side of the
aisle, and the deals and compromises regarding the budget package are made
only within the majority party.151 As a result, the measure comes before the
Senate with almost no minority support or involvement. This ensures a parti-
san environment for the consideration of the measure. It also ensures a signifi-
cant number of amendments from the minority since they have had no other
opportunity to influence consideration of the budget package.1
52
148. Congress could also avoid a budget act point of order by creating a reserve fund. See
supra note 78.
149. See supra note 32.
150. See supra note 33.
151. See, e.g., Eric Pianin & John E. Young, Senate Approves 7-year Budget Plan, WASH.
PosT, Oct. 28, 1995, at Al (detailing how a reconciliation bill was passed with only votes from
the majority party).
152. Id.
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E. Abuse ofProcess
Due to thp Budget Act's unique provisions and its complicated nature, the
budget process is ripe for abuse. The reconciliation process allows substantive
legislative proposals to escape a filibuster threat. Therefore, the fate of legis-
lation may hinge on whether or not the legislation is properly considered
within a reconciliation bill. If the provision violates the Budget Act and is im-
properly within the budget reconciliation package, the provision will most
likely need sixty votes. Due to the partisan nature regarding consideration of
the budget, it is unlikely that most measures will receive a supermajority vote.
Thus, the interpretation of the Budget Act and Budget Act points of order play
an essential role in determining what provisions violate the Act, and thus re-
quire a supermajority vote, and what provisions are in compliance, and there-
fore may be considered as part of the reconciliation package without a super-
majority vote. In recent years, the minority has complained in several
instances about what it claims is partisan manipulation of the budget process.
1. Use of Social Security Funds in Violation of Section 310(d)
Under section 310(d) of the Budget Act, social security outlay reductions
may not be used to offset non-social security spending increases.53 In 1995,
as part of the consideration of the Balanced Budget Act of 1995, the chairman
of the Senate Committee on Finance offered an amendment to increase funding
for Medicaid grants in certain states.' 54 The chairman paid for those increases
by legislating a technical correction which decreased the social security cost-
of-living adjustment (COLA). 155
Since social security is a mandatory program, social security spending is
estimated by CBO based on the number of participants and based on economic
projections. 5 6 Social security recipients receive an increase in their benefits
based on increases in inflation as measured by the Consumer Price Index
("CPI").' 57 In 1995, CBO originally projected the CPI to be 3.1%. 15' Later in
1995, updated figures indicated that the actual CPI would be 2.6%.1 9 The
lower CPI figure meant that COLAs would be reduced and that there would be
a significant savings to the government. However, CBO does not credit as
savings the technical change in estimates from 3.1% to 2.6% because those
153. See supra notes 130-31.
154. 141 CONG. REC. S16,048 (daily ed. Oct 27, 1995) (vote on Roth Amendment).
155. 141 CONG. REC. S16,039 (statement of Sen. Roth); see generally, 141 CONG. REC
S16,111-56 (daily ed. Oct 27, 1995) (debating whether the money that is being used to increase
Medicaid comes from cuts in social securityand therefore is out of order under the Budget Act).
156. See31 U.S.C. § 1105 (1994).
157. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1382(f) (West 1992).
158. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFF., THE ECONOMIC AND BUDGET OUTLOOK: FISCAL
YEARS 1996-2000 xiv (1995) (CPI projected at 3.1%).
159. 141 CONG. REC. S16,039 (statement of Sen. Roth).
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changes would occur automatically under existing law. 160 It is a technical eco-
nomic change, not a legislative one.
The chairman's amendment, however, legislated the already occurring
change. 61 The chairman thus legislated that the COLA for social security
would be reduced from 3.1% to 2.6% and claimed the savings from that re-
duction. He claimed the savings even though current law already required that
the COLA would be 2.6%.
Senator Graham raised a Budget Act point of order that the chairman's
amendment violated section 310(d) of the Budget Act because it caused an
outlay reduction to social security. 62 Graham's logic was that if you are re-
ducing the social security COLA from 3.1% to 2.6%, then social security
spending is being reduced and there is an outlay reduction. 16  However, the
chairman of the Budget Committee claimed otherwise, he claimed that there
was no point of order and that "dollar numbers being referred to are actual."'"
He would not comment as to why they were "actual" or why they should not be
considered an outlay reduction from social security.165 The Parliamentarian
held, "The scoring of this bill under the Budget Act is under the control of the
chairman of the Budget Committee, and the precedents of the Senate do not go
beyond that. The point of order is not well taken."166 Under this precedent, a
point of order under section 310(d) of the Budget Act can be avoided on a par-
tisan basis simply based on the scoring determination of the chairman of the
Budget Committee. Thus, the chairman can score a measure one way for the
majority in order to facilitate amendments and an entirely different way for the
minority in order to prevent amendments. There is nothing to constrain the
chairman in his scoring decisions based on this precedent.
160. The Assistant Director for Budget of the Congressional Budget Office claimed that
CBO and OMB:
[D]o not score savings for legislating a COLA that would happen anyway under current
law. This rule was applied to veterans compensation 1991 and to food stamps in
1992 ....
At the request of the Budget Committees, the CBO has from time to time up-
dated the baseline to reflect recent economic and technical developments. In such cir-
cumstances, however, we insist on incorporating all relevant new information, not just
selected items, such as COLAs. In this instance... if we were to include all of the in-
formation in our August baseline, plus the actual 1996 COLA, our estimate of the 2002
deficit.., would be higher.
141 CONG. REC. S16,045 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1995) (Senator Graham reading letter from The As-
sistant Director for Budget of the Congressional Budget Office).
161. 141 CONG. REC. S16,045 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1995) (statement by Sen. Graham).
162. 141 CONG. REC. S16,047 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1995) (statement by Sen. Graham).
163. Id.
164. Id. at S16,048 (statement by Sen. Domenici).
165. Id.
166. Id. at S 16,048 (statement by parliamentarian).
SAJNTLOUIS UNIVERSITYPUBLICLAWREVIEW
The Budget Act also prohibits any reconciliation bill, as amended or re-
ported, from amending the Social Security Act.167 Senator Harkin raised a
point of order arguing that since the Roth amendment changed the social secu-
rity COLA, it was amending the Social Security Act in violation of section
310(g).161 The amendment, however, did not specifically amend the Act. The
amendment stated: "Notwithstanding any other provision of law.., any such
adjustment [to the CPI] which takes effect during fiscal year 1996 shall be
equal to 2.6 percent."' 69 Even though the amendment impacted the Social Se-
curity Act and changed the social security COLA, the Chair ruled that the point
of order was not well taken.
170
Senator Harkin then argued that section 310(g) can now be circumvented
by using the words "notwithstanding any other provision of law."'171 The Chair
again asserted that the chairman of the Budget Committee has the authority to
make the determination with regard to section 310(g).172 Once again, the
Budget Act allows the chairman of the Budget Committee to manipulate the
process and score a provision one way for the majority and an entirely different
way for the minority. Without consistent interpretation, it is impossible for
members of Congress to know whether an amendment will or will not violate
the Act.
2. Application of the Byrd Rule and the Germaneness Standard
Both the Byrd Rule and the germaneness standard require subjective inter-
pretation of their provisions. Section 305(b)(2) of the Budget Act states that
"[n]o amendment that is not germane" shall be received. 173 However, germa-
neness has a very fungible definition. 74 The lack of clarity regarding germa-
neness allows for significant manipulation of the process. If the Parliamentar-
ian determines that an amendment is not germane, the amendment cannot be
considered without sixty votes. Thus, a decision regarding germaneness may
decide the fate of a proposed provision.
For example, in 1995, the Parliamentarian determined that since the Senate
reconciliation bill did not contain any specific revenue provisions, any
amendment to increase taxes would be considered not germane. 17  However,
167. CBA, § 310(g), amended by GRH § 201, 99 Stat. at 1055 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 641(g)
(1994)).
168. 141 CONG. REC. S16,148 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1995).
169. 141 CONG. REC. S16,156 (daily ed. Oct 27, 1995).
170. Id. atS16,048.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. See supra part II.C.1.
174. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 760 (3d ed. 1992) (defining "germane" as "both
pertinent and fitting").
175. See 141 CoNG. REC. S7344-45 (daily ed. May 24, 1995) (amendment to transfer $15
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the reconciliation bill contained a complicated procedure which would allow
for a tax cut if the Senate passed a balanced budget. 176 Since the resolution
contained a provision which would require a tax cut if a budget reconciliation
bill was passed, it would have been equally plausible for the Parliamentarian to
rule that the revenue amendments were germane.
The Byrd Rule provisions are similarly susceptible to manipulation. The
Byrd Rule prohibits extraneous matter form being considered on a reconcilia-
tion.177  However, the definition of extraneous, like germaneness, requires
subjective interpretation, and is interpreted by the Parliamentarian without a
bright line test or even set guidelines. As Senator Domenici, the Chairman of
the Senate Budget Committee acknowledged, "The budget has become an ex-
tremely controversial issue and efforts to include extraneous matter in recon-
ciliation has led to abuse in the past by both Republicans and Democrats."
178
Disputes regarding germaneness and the Byrd Rule usually involve honest
differences regarding the interpretation of the Budget Act. However, the Sen-
ate places sole authority regarding the interpretation of the Act with the
Chair 179 and authority regarding "scoring" under the Act with the Senate
Budget Committee. I80 The Parliamentarian has not outlined a specific or con-
sistent test for germaneness or for the Byrd Rule. In addition, the Parliamen-
tarian is not bound by past Senate precedent.'18  Thus absent clear rules and
binding precedent, it is extremely unclear what will be considered germane or
extraneous. If there is no clear standard, the test is ripe for political manipula-
tion.
billion from the tax cut to Agriculture violated section 305 and was not germane).
176. The majority argued that there would be a significant increase in economic growth (an
"economic dividend") due to the passage of a balanced budget. Which would cause a dividend of
approximately $170 billion. The budget reconciliation bill contained a provision that allowed the
Senate to consider a $170 billion tax cut bill after the passage of the original reconciliation bill.
The Parliamentarian, however, ruled that any amendment to limit the amount of the tax cut would
be not germane since the actual tax cut was not included in the reconciliation bill. The tax cut
would be included in a subsequent bill, if the original bill was passed. For a general discussion
of this matter, see 141 CONG. REC. S17,247-79 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1995).
177. See supra part II.C.1.
178. 142 CONG. REC. S8521 (July 23, 1996) (statement by Sen. Domenici) (Sen. Domenici
also claims that the Democrats manipulated the Byrd Rule in 1993 by placing provisions regard-
ing bovine growth hormones and a national vaccination program in reconciliation. Sen. Do-
menici paraphrased statements by other Republicans and argued that Chair's ruling in 1993 made
a complete joke of the Byrd Rule. He further implied that the Byrd Rule was being applied on a
"whimsical basis" and that "anything goes" under the Byrd Rule's enforcement in 1993.).
179. As discussed infra, the Chair usually acts on the advice of the Parliamentarian. See
TIEFER, supra note 32, at 512.
180. See supra part ll.C.
181. See supra note 126.
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IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
The Budget Act has become a morass of technical provisions which con-
fuse and complicate consideration of the federal budget. Congress should re-
turn to the roots of the Budget Act. It should simplify the budget process,
eliminate policy biases in the Act, and use the Act as a mechanism for consid-
ering the federal budget.182 The Budget Act should be policy neutral and pro-
mote, not inhibit, policy prioritization.
A. Repeal the Reconciliation Process
As discussed throughout this article, the budget reconciliation process has
been abused and manipulated beyond anything imagined when it was first en-
acted in 1974. The original premise of budget reconciliation was to reconcile
funding shortfalls between the first and second budget resolution. No one
imagined that it would become a method for circumventing the filibuster and
for making major substantive policy changes with extremely limited debate.
The absence of a reconciliation process will not prevent Congress from
considering reductions in entitlement spending.. Major changes to Medicare,
Medicaid, and social security are still possible without a reconciliation process.
Changes to entitlement programs are no more or less important than changes to
other major laws. If Congress wanted to change the Civil Rights Act, the cur-
rent health care system, or the banking system, it would be required to do so
through the normal legislative process. The rules of the Senate allow for un-
limited debate absent a vote of cloture. Entitlement programs, including Medi-
care, Medicaid, food stamps and child nutrition, should not be exempted from
the cloture requirement simply because reducing funding for those programs
will provide deficit reduction.
Furthermore, deficit reduction alone is not an acceptable rationale for fast-
track consideration. Appropriations bills, which allocate funding for discre-
tionary programs, are still considered through the regular legislative process.
These bills only require a majority vote for passage, but a filibuster threat ex-
ists against each appropriations bill. In fact, appropriations bills still pass the
Senate and very few are ultimately filibustered.
183
Repeal of the reconciliation process will ensure that important measures
which drastically change current law are given ample consideration. It will
182. Most budget process "reform" proposal advocate increasing the regulation regarding the
process. See generally -LR. REP. No. 413, 103d Cong., 1st. Sess. (1993). See also H.R.. 2599,
104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); H.R.. 4285, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996).
183. In fact, the opportunity to filibuster appropriations bills ensures that these bills are con-
sidered on a bipartisan basis. Partisanship in the appropriations process exists, but to a much
lesser extent than in the budget process. The repeal of reconciliation may decrease the partisan-
ship in the budget process and ensure that budget packages are considered with bipartisan sup-
port.
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also ensure that all legislative changes, those to repeal existing entitlement
programs and those to create new ones, follow the same basic rules of the Sen-
ate. In addition, repeal of reconciliation will return the Budget Act to its roots
and ensure a policy neutral mechanism for considering our nation's budget pri-
orities.
However, even if Congress continues to use the reconciliation process,
there are several steps it can take to reform and simplify the process. First, the
Parliamentarian should be required to set out guidelines and rules regarding the
definitions of extraneousness and germaneness, or Congress should legislate
further guidelines and rules. The Parliamentarian should also be required to
articulate for the record the reasons for his decisions and the assumptions he
used in reaching those conclusions. Finally, the Parliamentarian should be re-
quired to rely on his past decisions absent a directive from the full Senate to
the contrary.
Second, the time for consideration of reconciliation bills should be ex-
tended. The melee that occurs at the end of each reconciliation where the Sen-
ate considers amendment after amendment with no debate is irresponsible.18
Significant policy changes are being enacted during reconciliation and these
provisions deserve ample opportunity for debate.
185
Third, the Senate should make two clarifications to the Act regarding the
scope and number of reconciliation bills. The Senate should either close the
loophole which allows for multiple reconciliation bills or should make clear
that reprioritization should be allowed among reconciliation bills. In addition,
the Senate should close the loop-hole created in 1995 when an unknown future
economic dividend was used to allow for future tax cuts. If the Senate creates
contingency instructions, amendments which relate to those contingencies
should be in order.
184. During the consideration of the 1997 Budget Reconciliation Bill, Senator Byrd offered
an amendment to increase the time for consideration of reconciliation to thirty hours and to elimi-
nate the ability to offer amendments after thirty hours expired. The amendment was intended to
eliminate that practice of offering numerous amendments after time on reconciliation expired.
The amendment was passed by a vote of 92-8. 143 CONG. REC. S6681 (daily ed. June 27, 1997).
The conference agreement did not incorporate the provision but instead created a bipartisan task
force to study the issue. See 143 CONG. REC. H6280 (daily ed. July 29, 1997).
185. Sen. Byrd stated:
I was here when we adopted the Budget Act of 1974. I never comprehended, never could
I have imagined that the reconciliation process would have been used as it is being used
here, a reconciliation process in which we bring several bills into one massive bill, on
which the time for debate is severely restricted. Cloture in nothing as compared with the
time limitation on the reconciliation bill. Cloture is but a speck on the distant horizon as
compared with this bear trap.
141 Cong. Rec. S16,034 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1995).
SAINTLOUIS UNIVERSITYPUBLICLAWREVIEW
B. Eliminate most Budget Act Point of Orders
Several Budget Act points of order hamper Congress's ability to prioritize
funds. Since setting out Congress's priorities is a major part of the budget
process, the process should encourage, not discourage, such prioritization.
Thus, points of order which inhibit prioritization should be removed.
First, Congress should remove any "wall" between domestic and defense
discretionary spending. Neither category should be artificially protected. If a
majority believes that funds should be transferred from defense to domestic, or
vice versa, such a transfer should not be artificially prohibited.
Second, Congress should remove the wall between discretionary spending
and revenues and mandatory programs. Congress should be able to increase
revenues to fund discretionary programs, or entitlement programs, or to cut
discretionary spending and provide a tax cut. These may not be wise policy
changes, but the Budget Act itself should not favor one particular type of
spending over another.
In addition, Congress should examine the possibility of eliminating almost
all Budget Act points of order and spending targets and replacing them with
one aggregate flexible target. Such a target would include the baseline expen-
ditures for mandatory spending, adjusted for technical and economic changes,
and the discretionary spending targets. A point of order and sequester would
only exist if Congress exceeded the one aggregate spending cap.
C. Long Term Planning
Congress should examine the budget scoring rules and attempt to return to
the basic principles of the Budget Act by encouraging long-term planning. In
the original act, Congress contemplated serious discussion about the economy
and long-term budget planning in its consideration of the budget. However,
meeting spending caps and PAYGO requirements have often encouraged Con-
gress to think short term. Budget scoring rules and accounting procedures
should be modified to enhance long term planning. In addition, Congress
should return to pre-1996 rules regarding asset sales.
CONCLUSION
The Budget Act has evolved into a complicated, dysfunctional method for
considering the federal budget. It is no longer simply a mechanism for consid-
eration of the aggregate budget, but has become a process with both policy and
partisan bias. The Act clearly favors certain policies over others and is full of
provisions which are designed to achieve certain policy goals. These have no
place in a purely structural piece of legislation and thus have no place in the
Budget Act.
Congress should return the Budget Act to its roots. It should greatly sim-
plify the budget process and create a purely structural system, with no policy
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bias, for consideration of the federal budget.

